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INTERNATIONAL LAW AND EXTRATERRITORIAL
APPLICATION OF THE ANTITRUST LAWS
GEORGE WINTHROP HAIGHTt
Ix the absence of a clear legislative intent to the contrary, the courts of
this country will apply and enforce the principles of public international law.2
One such principle is that the penal laws of a nation cannot "extend beyond
its own territories, except so far as regards its own citizens." 2 The United
States, Great Britain, France, and a majority of other civilized States recog-
nize that the jurisdictional competence of a State is governed by this terri-
torial principle.3 A court may, however, in ignorance or disregard of this
principle, seek to punish a foreigner, over whom it has obtained jurisdiction
according to its own rules, for alleged acts that have been performed abroad.
Moreover, in many States an exception to the territorial principle is recog-
nized where an offense has been committed abroad against the security,
integrity or independence of the State.4 No such "protective" principle, how-
1fember, New York Bar. The author gratefully aclnowledges the contributions to
this article which have been made by Sir Valentine Holmes, Q.C., Inner Temple, London,
and Professor Otto Kahn-Freund of the London School of Economics.
1. "[A]n act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations
if any other possible construction remains. . . *" The Schooner Charming Betsy, 2
Cranch 64, 118 (US. 1804). Also see, 36AXWELL, INT PRETATio. OF STATUTES 152 (9th
ed. 1946). For an interesting discussion of the new Netherlands constitutional provisions
relating to the supremacy of international agreements, see van Panhuys, The .Vethcrlan:ds
Constitutioa and Internzational Law, 47 A, . J. INT'l. L. 537 (1953).
2. Story, J., in The Apollon, 9 Wheat. 362, 370 (U.S. 1824). See 1 Hyns, INmTM-
NATIONAL LAW CHIEFLY AS INTERPRETED AND APmi BY THE UNITED STATES 726-30.
804-09 (2d ed. 1945) ; 2 Moopx, A DIGEsT OF INTERMATIONAL LAv 236 (1905) ("There
is no principle better settled than that the penal laws of a country have no extraterritorial
force."). Also see SToRy, COMMENTARIES ON THE Co FLicr or LAws 20-22 (7th ed. 1872).
3. "A country is no more entitled to assume jurisdiction over foreigners than it
would be to annex a bit of territory which happened to be very convenient for it." Lord
Finlay, in The Case of the S. S. "Lotus,' P.C.I.J. Ser. A, No. 10/9 p. 56 (1927). See
also the opinions in this case of judges Loder (pp. 34, 35), Weiss (p. 44), Nyholm
(p. 63), Moore (pp. 92-4) and Altamira (p. 95) ; STORY, op. cit. supra note 2, at 767-9;
WHE&ON, ELEMENTS OF INTERNATiONAL LAW 270-4 (6th Eng. ed., Keith, 1929);
OPPENHE.IM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 293-302 (7th ed., Lauterpacht, 1948); DE VAMRMES,
INXTODUcTION A L'ETUD u DoroiT PENAL INTRnATIONAL 438-58 (1922) and L"s
PRE-cIPEs MOSENEs Du DROIT PENAL INTERNATIONAL 11-13 (1928) ; Research in Inter-
national Law under the Auspices of the Harvard Law School, Jurisdiction uith Respect
to Crime, 49 Amr. J. INT'L L. Supp. 480-4 (1935) (hereinafter cited as Harvard Research);
Hanbury, The Territorial Limits of Criminal Jurisdiction, 37 PRon. oF PUn. AND PmvATE
INT'L LAW, THE GRorius SoclEr- 171 (1952); Beckett, The Exercise of Crit,:al Juris-
diction over Foregner, 6 Bar. Y.B. IN'L L. 44 (1925); Criminal Jurisdiction ever
Foreigner, 8 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 103 (1927).
4. Harvard Research, supra note 3, at 543-61.
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ever, is recognized by the United States or Great Britain. On the other
hand, the United States, Great Britain and many other countries accept an
"objective" application of the territorial principle: a State may exercise penal
jurisdiction over a foreign national in certain types of cases where a con-
summating act within the State's territory was a constituent element of a crime
committed abroad. 5
Extraterritorial application of American antitrust laws, as currently sought
by the Department of Justice and recognized in recent court decisions, con-
flicts with public international law. The conflict arises whenever an American
court attempts to prosecute and punish foreign nationals for their acts per-
formed outside the territorial limits of the United States which, if performed
within such limits, would violate the antitrust laws. Whether or not an
American court is competent, under public international law, to punish them
for their acts abroad depends on the applicability of the territorial principle
to antitrust prosecutions; and, if the territorial principle does apply, whether
or not an "objective" application is permissible or the "protective" principle
may be applied.
THE TERRITORIAL PRINCIPLE AND THE ANTITRUST LAWS
The territorial principle is applicable to Sherman Act prosecutions because
these proceedings are penal.6 The distinctions which prevail in the United
States between criminal and civil proceedings under the Sherman Act-be-
tween indictment and subsequent fine or imprisonment, on the one hand, and
a bill in equity and subsequent injunction or order compelling the disposition
of property or perhaps reconstruction of an industry, on the other-are not
relevant in determining whether the proceedings are penal in the international
law sense. What are civil proceedings under the municipal law may be,
and usually are, highly penal. While criminal proceedings carry the stigma
of indictment, finger-printing and convicti6n, civil proceedings may result in
shackling a company in perpetuity with the fetters of a decree forbidding it
to do a great many things. Since the decree may be difficult to interpret, a
wide range of company behavior will be subject to the constant peril of a
prosecution for contempt. In addition to this, orders may be issued requiring
the company to divest itself of valuable property which it holds abroad, to
5. Id. at 487-503.
6. See Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, 26 STAT. 209 (1890), 36 STAT. 1167
(1911), 50 STAT. 693 (1937), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1946). Although the discussion which
follows will relate primarily to these sections, the principles apply with like force to
other penal provisions of the antitrust laws.
The offenses that are proscribed by this Act are criminal offenses in the sense that
they are public wrongs which may be redressed at the instance of the State in
proceedings which have as their objective the infliction of punishment or the impositions
of penalties remissible only by the State. See Kenny, The Nature of a Crime in TvRNEn,
KENNY'S OUTLINE OF CRIMINAL LAW 530-46 (16th ed. 1952).
[Vol. 63: 639
INTERNATIONAL LAW
alter contracts, to license patents, and to grant patent immunities.7 Orders
such as these and injunctions which forbid the performance of contracts made
abroad and valid by the laws of the States where they are made clearly con-
stitute an interference with the internal trade and commerce of foreign states
which it is the purpose of the territorial principle to avoid.8
In United States v. Aluminum Company of America (Alcoa)," Judge Hand
asserted jurisdiction over cartel agreements made abroad by foreign com-
panies, the American company not being a party to them. He said that these
agreements, notwithstanding their completely foreign nature, were unlawful
because "they were intended to affect imports and did affect them," and
because "any state may impose liabilities even upon persons not within its
allegiance, for conduct outside its borders that has consequences within its
borders which the state reprehends."' 0
7. See e.g., United States v. Imperial Chemical Industries, Ltd., 105 F. Supp. 215,
220 (S.D.N.Y. 1952) ("Our objective is to fashion . . .means by which the agreement
found to edst is terminated, its revival prevented and its effects desiroyed. .. :')
(emphasis added). In United States v. General Electric Co., 115 F. Supp. 835, 851, 852,
878 (D.N.J. 1953), however, the court excepted Philips, the Netherlands company, from
provisions for access to records other than those located in the United States. The
reason given for the exceptions was the possibility of "international complications." The
court also refused to require Philips to grant immunities involving foreign patents.
8. Decrees on these lines, when applied to property owned by foreigners abroad,
have provoked courts and governments to protest in vigorous terms. Judge Ryan's order
in the ICI case, compelling the dismemberment of a Canadian company with Canadian
shareholders as an alternative to divestiture of stock in the Canadian company by one
defendant company or the other, was described by an important Canadian newspaper as
"sheer effrontery," "American judicial arrogance," "incredible" and "irresponsible." The
Globe and Mail, Toronto, Aug. 20, 1952, p. 6, col. 1.
More recently, the Department of Justice, in the grand jury investigation of the inter-
national oil industry, attempted to subpoena correspondence, files, and other documents
of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, an English concern, relating to a vast field of activity
outside of the United States. In re Investigation of World Arrangements with Relation
to the Production, Transportation, Refining and Distribution of Petroleum in Possible
Violation of Title 15 U.S.C. Sections 1-23: Misc. No. 19-52, D.D.C., 1952. The British
Government directed the officers and directors of that company not to produce the dozu-
ments, considering the subpoena to be contrary to international comity. Transcript of
Record, Investigation, supra, at 386. See also id. at 509, 595-667, 734-753, 759-773.
Prohibitions were also issued by the Governments of the Netherlands, France, India, and
Pakistan. Id. at 570, 730, 731, 756. Belgium is not referred to in the Transcript, hut
the government of that country issued prohibitions.
Also see, Fletcher-Cooke, Risk of Applying American Anti-Trust Lauy to ,lffddle East
Oil in The Daily Telegraph, London, Nov. 20, 1952, p. 6, cols. 3-5, which stated in regard
to the above investigations that: "However backward and benighted the United State(.
may think the rest of the world is over the matter of monopolies and restraints of
trade, the truth is that she cannot, even if she wants to, enforce her sincere and deep
convictions upon countries whose outlook is entirely different." See also Comity and the
Oil Companies, 165 THE EcoNouIsT 556 (1952).
9. 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
10. Id. at 443. The Agreements referred to were, first, an Agreement made in Paris
in 1931 to which all parties were foreign companies and which did not take imports
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More recently, Judge Ryan in United States v. Imperial Chemical Indus-
tries (ICI) " deemed the law to be "crystal clear: a conspiracy to divide
territories, which affects American commerce, violates the Sherman Act."' 2
But his orders directing disposition of industrial property abroad were dis-
regarded by the Court of Appeal in England because they were an attempt
to "assert an extra-territorial jurisdiction which the Courts of this country
cannot recognize .... 13 Referring to the statement in Judge Ryan's opinion
that "it is not an intrusion on the authority of a foreign sovereign for this
court to direct that steps be taken to remove the harmful effects on the trade
of the United States,"'14 the Master of the Rolls said:
"If by that passage the learned Judge intended to say (as it seems
to me that he did) that it was not an intrusion on the authority of
a foreign sovereign to make directions addressed to that foreign
sovereign or to its courts or to nationals of that foreign Power
effective to remove (as he said) 'harmful effects on the trade of the
United States', I am bound to say that, as at present advised, I find
myself unable to agree with it."1 5
The Alcoa and ICI cases evidence a basic misconception regarding the
international law competence of the United States to proceed against foreign
into the United States into account in fixing production and distribution quotas; second,
a 1936 Agreement, also made abroad between the same parties, which provided for the
payment of royalties in respect to production exceeding free quotas. There was no
reference in the 1936 Agreement to imports into the United States, and the district
court found that only the Canadian company counted shipments to that country as part
of its production quota. 44 F. Supp. 97, 285 (S.D.N.Y. 1941). Judge Hand held, how-
ever, that the general restriction on production outside the United States, at which the
1936 Agreement was directed, evidenced a clear intent to affect imports into the United
States and that the burden was on the defendants to prove that there was no such
effect. As they failed to sustain this burden, the Agreement of 1936 was found to violate
section 1 of the Sherman Act. In the district court, Judge Caffey had said that all
parties were agreed that the question was whether or not the foreign combination was
"to so operate in this country as to directly and materially affect our foreign commerce."
Id. at 283. He held that the burden was on the Government to prove such direct anld
material effect and that they had not sustained the burden.
11. 100 F. Supp. 504, final order entered, 105 F. Supp. 215 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
12. United States v. Imperial Chemical Industries, Ltd., 100 F. Supp. 504, 592
(S.D.N.Y. 1951) (emphasis added).
13. British Nylon Spinners Ld. v. Imperial Chemical Industries Ld., [1-953] 1 Ch. 19,
24.
14. United States v. Imperial Chemical Industries, Ltd., 105 F. Supp. 215, 229
(S.D.N.Y. 1951). The court in framing the decree stated that "3. No provision of this
judgment shall operate against ICI for action in compliance with any law of the
United States Government or of any foreign government or instrumentality thereof to
which ICI is at the time being subject and concerning matters over which under the law
of the United States such foreign government or instrumentality thereof has jurisdiction."
Quoted in British Nylon Spinners Ld. v. Imperial Chemical Industries Ld., [1953] 1 Ci.
19 n.4.




nationals under the antitrust laws. If a State can take jurisdiction over acts
committed abroad by foreigners because they have "consequences" within
its territory and it "reprehends" such acts, the door is open to an almost un-
limited extension of e-xtraterritorial jurisdiction. That foreign nationals
are answerable for their acts within the territory of the United States is
beyond question, but to prosecute them for what they do abroad can be justi-
fied only if an objective application to the territorial principle is permissible,
or if a valid exception to that principle is applicable. Unless "consequences"
and "harmful effects" mean "constituent element of a crime," which might
permit an objective application, these decisions are contrary to international
law.
OBJECTIVE APPLICATION Nor PERMISSIBLE
Even if judges Hand and Ryan were relying on the objective application
of the territorial principle, this exception to the strict rule of territoriality is
of limited scope,' 6 and would not extend to Sherman Act violations. The
Lotus 17 is the leading case in international law in which such an application
has been involved. There a collision, outside territorial waters, between
a French and a Turkish vessel, caused the loss of the latter and the death
of eight Turkish nationals. When the French ship arrived at Constantinople,
its officer in charge of the watch was tried and convicted of involuntary man-
slaughter. The French and Turkish governments agreed to submit to the
Permanent Court of International justice the question whether Turkey had
"acted in conflict with the principles of international law" in prosecuting
the French officer. The Court decided in favor of Turkey on the ground that
the crime had been committed in Turkish territory (the Turkish vessel) not-
withstanding the fact that the French officer had at all times remained on
board the French vessel. The case is authority for the proposition that a
16. John Bassett Moore has emphasized that in no case had an English or American
court assumed jurisdiction "even under statutes couched in the most general lauguage,
to try and sentence a foreigner for acts done by him abroad, unless they were brought,
either by an immediate effect or by direct and continuous causal relationship, within the
territorial jurisdiction of the court." Moorn, REoRr oN EXTmATzrziTo:AL CmUsE AND
THE CUTTNG CAss 34 (1887). The effect being indistinguishable from the act, each
has been said to constitute an "essential constituent element" or "part" of the crime, thus
justifying the exercise of territorial jurisdiction. Harvard Research, supra note 3, at
480, 494, 495. In the Lotus case, the Permanent Court of International Justice pointed
out that the two elements of the offense-the act of negligence or imprudence which had
its origin on the French ship and the effect felt on board the Turkish ship-were "legally,
entirely inseparable, so much so that their separation renders the offense non-existent."
The Case of the S.S. "Lotus," supra note 3, at 30. The assumption that "the place where
the effect is produced is the place where the act was committed is in every case a legal
fiction" and is only justified "where the act and its effect are indistinguishable." Id. at
37 (M. Loder).
17. Case of the S. S. "Lotus," supra note 3. See 2 HRcxwonmr, DIGEST or INTM-
NATIONAL LAw 193-6 (1941); 1 PrrT CoBBErr, CASES ONz INTwmATionAL LAw 250-3
(6th ed. 1947).
1954]
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State has competence to punish a foreigner for his acts abroad if such acts
form a constituent element of a crime consummated within the territory
of the State.'"
It is, however, clear from the opinions in The Lotus that an objective
application of the territorial principle is only permissible when not only is
the consummation or "effect" inseparable from the act committed abroad but
the offense is one which the community of civilized nations has come to re-
gard as justifying a modification of the strict territorial principle. In the
case of antitrust violations, there are several features which distinguish such
offenses from those so regarded by the community of civilized nations.
In the first place, taking the Sherman Act as the example, violations of
Sections 1 and 2 19 do not fall within any category of crimes which are com-
mon to such community; they are offenses created by Congress for the pur-
pose of better regulating commerce between the states and with foreign nations,
and they express the public policy of the United States on American trade
and the American economy. Not even such a policy, let alone the "crime"
itself, is common to other civilized societies. It is significant that no mention
of this type of economic crime has been made in comprehensive comments in
this country on the objective application of the territorial principle.2 0 Indeed,
condonation of such a "crime" by foreign nations is not a subject for pro-
18. See WILLIAMS, CHAPTERS ON CURRENT INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE LEAGUE
OF NATIONS 209 (1929); Brierly, The "Lotus" Case, 44 L.Q. Ray. 154 (1928); Comment,
37 YALE L.J. 484 (1928). Judge Moore's dissent was limited to the proposition that
Article 6 of the Turkish Penal Code was contrary to international law as it asserted
penal jurisdiction over foreigners for acts committed by them outside Turkey "to the
prejudice . . . of a Turkish subject." The Court had refused to consider this question
on the ground that it was not included in the comprornis. The Case of the S. S. "Lotus,"
supra note 3, at 23, 24, 89-93.
The contention of Turkey that its competence must be presumed until a rule of inter-
national law prohibiting it could be established by France was supported by only a
minority of the permanent members of the Court and was severely criticized in the
separate opinions. See WILLIA.ms, op. cit. supra, at 215-22; BRIERLY, THE LAW op NA-
TIONs 52, 53 (4th ed. 1949).
19. 26 STAT. 209 (1890), 36 STAT. 1167 (1911), 50 STAT. 693 (1937), 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1, 2 (1946).
20. 1 Hyna, op. cit. supra note 2, at 804-13; Cook, The Application of the Crimtinal
Law of a Country to Acts Committed by Foreigners Outside the Jurisdiction, 40 W. VA.
L.Q. 303 (1934) ; Harvard Research, supra note 3, at 487-506. After stating that there
must be "a close and definite connection" between the act and the prosecutor, Hyde says
the "connection is . . . apparent when the act of the individual is one which the law
of nations itself renders internationally illegal or regards as one which any nember
of the international society is free to oppose and thwart" (emphasis added), I HYDI
op. cit. supra, at 804, 805; neither test can be satisfied in the case of antitrust law
offenses. Even if the international community should eventually agree that the emphasis
should be on the prevention of conduct regarded as "anti-social" and on the detention
of culprits, so that the place where the crime is committed assumes less importance,
Prof. Cook still adds: "Clearly not all kinds of so-called 'criminal acts' ought to be dealt
with on the 'cosmopolitan' theory . . . the mere fact of living together in groups makes
it necessary at all times and in all places to fix upon a certain number of types of conduct
(Vol. 63:639
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test.21 Even in the few instances where there is foreign legislation patterned
after the Sherman Act, there is little similarity between the law as it has
developed in the United States and the law in the countries which have such
legislation. 22
Although the Sherman Act purported originally to codify the common law,
our interpretation of restraint of trade has varied widely from that in other
English common law countries. Thus, the highest court in the British Com-
monwealth was "not aware of any case in which a restraint though reason-
able in the interests of the parties has been held unenforceable because it in-
volved some injury to the public."23 It has long been established in Eng-
land that if the restraint has been imposed in good faith and for the protection
of legitimate trading interests it is lawful even though it may be harmful to
third parties.2 4
Nor are there any statutory prohibitions in England. The Monopolies and
Restrictive Practices Commission at the instance of the Board of Trade in-
vestigates and reports what effect certain practices may have on the public
interest;25 and although it is developing a series of cases which may serve
to limit the common law freedom of traders to combine or agree upon re-
strictive practices,2 6 it is readily apparent from these cases and from the
which must be checked if group life is to continue. Very possibly attempts to apply a
'cosmopolitan' theory of crime ought to be limited to types of conduct of this general
character." Cook, supra, at 329.
21. Although the grant of a monopoly is "inconsistent with American ideas and
would probably be prejudicial to American interests, any official protest against it,
unless based upon treaty obligations, would necessarily have the appearance of attempting
to interfere with the sovereign right of a country to regulate its own export and import
trade." 2 MooIE, op. cit. supra note 2, at 77 (quoting Secretary of State Foster).
22. The laws of other countries are collected and discussed in REs Tcriv Bui; :a;.s
Pracices, (Economic and Social Council, United Nations) (E/2379, E/2379/Adds. 1, 2,
E/AC/37/2, E/AC. 37/2/Adds. 1, 2 April 29, March 13, 1953) ; REm= o7 mT Dmur-
uENT OF STATE, FOREIGNi LISLATiON CoNCEINING MONOPOLY AND CAnrM PLIAcrzczs,
SUBmiTrED TO THE SuB-ComI-IrE ON 'MONOPOLY OF THE SELRC- Coiirru ON S.nAM
BusNEss OF THE UNITE STATES SENATE, (July 9, 1952).
23. Attorney-General of the Commonwealth of Australia v. The Adelaide Steamship
Company, Limited [1913] A.C. 781, 795.
24. Mogul Steamship Company Limited v. McGregor, Gow & Co., 21 Q.B.D. 544,
553, 554 (1883), aff'd, 23 Q.B.D. 593 (C.A. 1889), [1892] A.C. 25; Attorney General
of the Commonwealth of Australia v. The Adelaide Steamship Company, Limited, [1913J
A.C. 781; North Western Salt Company, Limited v. Electrolytic Alkali Company,
Limited [1914] A.C. 461; Comment, The British Monopolies Act: A Contrast uith
Anzerican Policy and Practice, 59 YALE LJ. 899 (1950).
25. Moxorouns Am RsTspccm7 Pn.cEs (IN;QURY AND CONTro.L) Acr, 1943,
11. & 12 Geo. 6 Ch. 66. See Comment, The BritiW iMonopolies Act of 1948, supra note 24.
26. See, e.g., RPORT OF THE SUPPLY OF DENTAL Gooos (November 3, 1950), and
THE MONOPOLTEs AND REs'mI"v PR~cncrs (DENT - GooDs) Oaum (1951), which
came into operation on July 30, 1951; REPORT ON THE SUPPLY OF CAST IroN RIUNWATIu
GOODS (February 16, 1951); REPoRT ON THE SUPPLY OF ELcTc LAuPs (August 31,
1951); REPORT ON THE SUPPLY OF INSULATED E -ncuC WVIrs AND CA.Ls (April 25,
1952); REPoRT oN THE SUPPLY OF INSULI N (July 31, 1952); RIOM ON T E SU FLI
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debates in Parliament that the "crimes" of the Sherman Act are not regarded
as crimes in England, and that there are fundamental differences in the
criteria of reasonableness and protection of the public interest.27
The Australian Act of 1906 28 was modelled on the Sherman Act, but it
was soon held by the Privy Council that a detriment to the public was not
to be presumed from the fact that an agreement was in restraint of trade.20
In ascertaining whether a detriment to the public had been intended, workers
and producers were considered as much a segment of the public as con-
sumers, and in the long run the interests of all segments were deemed to be
the same, namely, to maintain the flow of goods. An intention, therefore,
to achieve this end by combining to raise prices and limit production for the
benefit of the workers and producers was not unlawful. Accordingly "the
Australian economy has become one of controlled and rationalized competition
in which private restraints of trade have become rather general."3 0
In Canada two types of action have been made offenses by statute: a con-
spiracy to prevent or lessen competition unduly, and a merger, trust, or
monopoly which has operated, or is likely to operate, against the public in-
terest.31 Although the law has been interpreted by the Canadian courts as
designed "for the protection of the specific public interest in free competi-
tion,"'32 illegal conspiracies must involve "undue" restraints, and public detri-
ment is an essential pre-requisite to condemnation either of a conspiracy or
of a merger, trust or monopoly. Penalties can be inflicted only in the form
AND EXPORT OF MATCHES AND THE SUPPLY OF MATCH-MAKING MACHINERY (October
2, 1952) ; REPORT ON THE SUPPLY OF I-MPORTED TIMBER, (July 23, 1953). Sanctions can
be applied whenever the Commission reports, or the House of Commons resolves, on
the basis of a Commission report, that existing practices operate against the public
interest, and an order has been approved by both Houses of Parliament. Thus far, only
an order relating to the Dental Goods industry has been issued.
27. See Dame Alix Kilroy, Address to Manchester Statistical Society, reported in
The Manchester Guardian, March 12, 1953, p. 4, col. 3; Kilroy, The Task and Methods
of the Monopolies Commission, 43 PROGRESS, THE MAGAZINE OF UNILEVER 125 (1953);
Rostow, Britain and Monopolies-An. Ainerican View, The Manchester Guardian, Feb.
16, 1953, p. 4, col. 6-7; The Structure of Industry and the Technical Revolion, 19
PLANNING No. 350 (1953); The Monopolies Commission, 19 PLANNING No. 353 (1953).
28. AUSTRALIAN INDUSTRIES PRESERVATION Act 1906 entitled "An Act for the preser-
vation of Australian industries and for the repression of destructive monopolies."
29. Attorney-General of the Commonwealth of Australia v. The Adelaide Steamship
Company, Limited, [1913] A.C. 781, affirming [1912] 15 C.L.R. 65, reversing [1911]
14 C.L.R. 387.
30. REPORT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, Op. cit. supra note 22, at 117. In the
State of New South Wales, Section 7 of the Monopolies Act of 1923 states: "Any coin-
bination of producers of any commodity which is reasonably necessary for the main-
tenance of the industry of such producers shall not be deemed to be to the detriment of
the public." Id. at 122.
31. Section 498 of the Criminal Code, R.S. 1927, c. 36, § 498; and §§ 2(1), 2(4) and
32 of the Combines Investigation Act, R.S. 1952, c. 314.
32. Container Materials Limited v. The King, [1942] S.C.R. 147, 152. See also Reg.
v. McGavin Bakeries, [19521 1 D.L.R. 201, 207.
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of fines or imprisonment or both; there is no procedure comparable to the
civil suit under the Sherman Act. And while there have been many con-
spiracy cases, there have been only two cases in 43 years under the monopoly
provisions.33
In addition to the considerable disparity in this type of legislation within
the British Commonwealth 3 4 other countries have failed to agree on the
nature and treatment of the offense.3 - There are statutory prohibitions in
some countries and regulatory measures in others, but in none has any juris-
prudence developed which in any substantial way resembles that of the United
33. For discussion of the Canadian legislation see the Rron? OF ThE DE.,nxr=..T
OF STATE, op. cit. supra note 22, at 101-117. One essential difference is that price-fixing
agreements are not illegal per se in Canada; they are illegal only if they are proved to be
detrimental to the public interest: this may be established by proof that the result has
been the elimination of competition over a substantial area of the market. REsMCTnc'
BusiXEss Pac'ricES, op. cit. supra note 22, at 21.
34. In the Union of South Africa, the proposed Regulation of Monopolistic Condi-
tions Act would define monopolistic conditions and provide for investigation to ascertain
whether they exist. If they are found to exist md to be detrimental to the public interest,
the case may be referred to the Minister of Economic Affairs. He might then require
any party to terminate the arrangement, to cease to be a party, or to refrain from
exercising an offensive practice, or he might declare the monop',listic condition unlawful
and require its dissolution.
In New Zealand, The Connnercial Trusts Act, 1910 (1910, No. 32) applies to a
limited number of commodities and bans particular types of practices: rebates or et.nces-
sions for exclusive dealing (§ 3), refusing to deal with a persnn who does not restrict
his dealing or who refuses to join a commercial trust (§ 4), and conspiring to mnnopA lize
contrary to the public interest (§ 5). It also forbids "unrcasoably high' prices charged
by members of commercial trusts or persons acting pursuant to their directions § C.
There have been no prosecutions since 1930, and only a few prior to that date. REro:r
OF THE DEPARTIEMT OF STATE, op. cit. supra note 22, at 124-31.
There is no legislation relevant to this subject in Pakistan or Ceylon. India has not
dealt specifically with the subject. See REsTsRcrivE BuTslras PnAcricEs (E/2379/Add.
2, Annex C), op. cit. supra note 22, at 101.
35. In European countries other than France there are few outright prohibitions,
since it is recognized that combinations and restrictive arrangemunts may be in the public
interest. In Sweden resale price maintenance and collusion in tenders are prohibited
unless the "Freedom of Commerce Board" grants permission. Laws of June 29, 1946 and
September, 1953. In Norway and Denmark the subject forms part of overall price con-
trol REPORT OF THE DEPARTMSENT OF STATE, op. di. supra note 22, at 63-75, 62-8; Nor-
VWEGIAN LAw OF JULY 25, 1953. A proposed new law in the Netherlands combines com-
pulsory registration with provisions for investigations, but there are no prohibitions. Bill
No. 2 and Explanatory Memorandum, submitted to States General November 24, 1953.
Belgian law is favorable to the formation of cartels. The emphasis is on protecting the
freedom of those who do not wish to enter the cartel, and on checking abuses contrary
to the interests of the parties concerned or, where there are concentrations of preponderant
economic power, abuses contrary to the public welfare. REPo=r OF TnE DEPAR N T_ oF
STATE, op. cit. supra, at 15-18; for proposed new law, see Productivit6, Brussels, De-
cember, 1953, p. 15. Austria deals with the matter by registration. REruon OF THr D c-
P.ART MENT OF STATE, Op. cit. sitpra, at 6-11. Switzerland has no legislation designed speci-
fically to combat restrictive agreements, although a 1947 amendment to the Constitution
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States. For example, since 1810 the Penal Code of France has made it a
criminal offense to cause an artificial enhancement in price by collective action,
The courts, however, refused to apply the law to prevent the recovery of
"normal" profits, and since an amendment in 1926 the law has been regarded
as applicable essentially to "excessive speculation."' 6
There is a second fundamental distinction between a Sherman Act offense
and the type of crime to which the objective application of the territorial
principle has been invoked with the sanction of the international community.
While in objective application cases the proximity of cause and effect is direct
and readily ascertainable, the Sherman Act offense is complex, and it is usual-
ly difficult to establish the relationship of cause and effect. When foreigners
agree abroad to fix prices, to limit production, to allocate territories or other-
wise "restrain trade" (in the United States sense), they may have no in-
tention or expectation that their arrangements will operate in the United
States; as in the case of the Phoebus Agreement 37 or the Swiss aluminum
cartel,88 they may even exclude the United States from the operative pro-
visions. Nevertheless, the foreigners may find themselves charged in the
paves the way for legislation "in derogation, if necessary, of the principle of freedom of
trade and industry." Id. at 59. What legislation will finally emerge in Germany and Italy
is still uncertain.
In Latin America the subject is not considered of importance. Id. at 154. In
Argentina drastic legislation on the subject of monopolies "has been to some extent
forgotten" and there seems to be no desire to enforce it, id. at 157, although some cases
were brought under an earlier law, id. at 158-9; in Brazil "restrictive business practices
are buried together with petty malfeasances and little regard for their importance is
evident," id. at 161; in Mexico legislation "has had little effect upon the suppression of
monopolies or the discouragement of restrictive business practices," id. at 169.
36. Id. at 20-23. The original Article 419 punished combinations which held
goods off the market or sold only at a certain price, or artificially raised or depressed
prices. The modified version in effect since 1926 punishes all those who, individually
or collectively, take action in the market "for the purpose of procuring a profit which
would not be the result of the natural operation of the law of supply and demand" or
who bring about an artificial change in prices. Thus, it is no longer the combination
or "entente" as such which is the offense: it is action, individual or colledive, in the
market with a view to abnormal gain. This is no longer "antitrust."
In August, 1953, the Council of Ministers issued a decree prohibiting (with certain
exceptions) collective action hindering cost reductions, furthering price increases,
maintaining minimum prices, unjustified discriminations in price increases or in meeting
demands for products or services. Dzcux No. 53-704 (August 9, 1953), amending the
Price Ordinance of June 30, 1945, No. 45-1483. An important exception to these pro-
hibitions is where the parties can show "improvement and expansion of outlets of pro-
duction" or can "assure the development of economic progress by rationalization and
specialization."
37. For this and related agreements governing the distribution of electric lamps
abroad, see United States v. General Electric Co., 82 F. Supp. 753, 828-48 (D.N.J. 1949).
See also REPORT ON TaE SUPPLY OF ELECTRIC LAMPS, op. cit. supra note 26, at 126-51.
38. The Canadian company, Aluminium Limited, endeavored to include the American
market in the 1931 Agreement, but European members of the cartel refused and shipped
metal to the United States. Shipments to this country were included in determining
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United States with a criminal offense which they could hardly have been
expected to foresee or to understand. 39 This is quite different from the com-
paratively simple cases of 4 shooting at B across a border, or of one ship
colliding with another and causing the death of some of its crew, or of arrang-
ing in one country to obtain money by false pretenses in another, or of send-
ing poison from one country to another, or from the many other cases to which
the territorial principle has been objectively applied. 40 In an antitrust case. it
is necessary to trace economic consequences which radiate from an act or a
complex of acts abroad into and through many different markets and terri-
tories. The more extensive these consequences are, the more difficult it be-
comes to identify them as they combine with, and are submerged by, con-
sequences radiating from other acts, conditions of supply and demand, tariff
barriers, currency controls, government quotas and subsidies, and the perils
of war or economic strife.
A third reason for excluding the Sherman Act offense from the objective
application of the territorial principle lies in the vague and uncertain nature
of the Act's prohib".ions. Not even American lawyers can always forecast
its application. To the foreigner it would be an intolerable burden to require
him or his lawyers to understand the intricacies of the case law under the
antitrust statutes, to prognosticate whether the rule of reason applied to his
activities in his own country or that what he did was a per se violation; and,
if the rule of reason did apply, to forecast the mental processes of an American
judge educated and living in a political and economic climate fundamentally
different from his own. By its very nature this type of legislation is replete
with uncertainty and unsuited to extraterritorial application.4'
Fourth, if international law were to permit an objective application in the
case of antitrust laws such as the Sherman Act, it would open the door to
interference with freedoms and liberties guaranteed by other nations. This
royalties under the 1936 Agreement, but there was no agreement nut to make such
shipments. The Agreement did not relate to production in the United States or to sle'
there. United States v. Aluminum Company of America, 44 F. Supp. 97, 230-5 (S.Dg..Y.
1941).
39. It appears to be judge Learned Hand's view that the foreigner acts at his peril
when he can foresee consequences within the United States. See text at note 10 .supra.
Claudy, Sherman Anti-Trust Law: Applicabilit, to Foreign Commerce, 37 Co.umz L Q.
821 (1952), taking the matter to its logical conclusion, says that "it is difficult to imagine
any association of even potential, unestablished competitors that might nt produce, from
within or without the United States, a proscribed effect upon United States export or
import trade." Id. at 825 n.25.
40. The cases in which the territorial principle has been "objectively" applied are re-
viewed in Harvard Research, supra note 3, at 487-503. See also Cook, sufra note 2d.
But see Timberg in Oppenheim, Nerenberg, Diggen,, & Timberg, The Impact of the
Anti-Trust Laws on Patcats and Trade-Marl: in Foreign Commerce, 21 GIo. WAsu. L
REv. 663 (1953) ; Weisner, .4 Half Ccntury of Jurisdictional Derelopunzct: From Ba:anas
to Watches, 7 ML i LQ. 400, 403 n.1 (1953).
41. See Wolf, La Legislation Antitrust des Etats-Unis ct ses Effets Intc:ationanx,
2 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE DRoiT ComPAm 440, 475 (1950).
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was a concern expressed in the Cutting case in which an American citizen
was tried, convicted, and imprisoned in Mexico for publishing in the United
States a libel against a Mexican. 42 There the liberty in question was freedom
of speech :43 in the case of the extraterritorial application of laws regulating
trade it is freedom of trade and freedom of contract. For example. as noted
above, there is no law in England against combinations, collective boycotts or
other restraints of trade ;4 on the contrary, the liberty of traders to combine
and exclude other traders is a fundamental liberty which can be freely exer-
cised in the absence of malice or some unlawful purpose. 45 This is true ill
most other countries, particularly on the continent of Europe.46 Thus in
Switzerland, the Federal Court has repeatedly stated that cartel agreements
are protected by the principle of freedom of contract guaranteed by the Civil
Code.4
7
In any country, trade regulation or lack of it is determined by the judgment
of that country as to what is best in its own public interest. Nations neces-
sarily differ according to race, geography, climate, raw materials, and social
and economic development.48 In many instances a highly competitive economy
is considered wholly unsuitable, and combinations are regarded as essential.
It is impossible to say that what may in this respect be in the interests of
the American public must also be in the public interest of other civilized
countries. So long as nations are independent, each one must determine for
itself what is in the interest of its own public. In the absence of treaty or
convention, therefore, there is no basis in international law or practice for
42. See FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 751 (1887) ; 2 FoRui(aX RELA-
TIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1114-80 (1888) ; 2 MOORE, A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW 228-42 (1906); MOORE, REPORT ON EXTRATERRITORIAL CRIME AND TiE' CUTTrNi
CASE 7-8 (1887).
43. See sources cited note 42 supra. Mexico asserted jurisdiction because the act of
the accused was a penal offense in the United States as well as in Mexico. The United
States protested that it was a violation of international law for Mexico to apply its
penal laws to an offense "committed and consummated" by an American citizen outside
Mexican territory, pointing out that if a country were permitted to exercise such juris-
diction it "would create a dual responsibility" in the foreigner, would "lead to inex-
tricable confusion" and would be "destructive of that certainty in the law which is an
essential of liberty."
44. Collective boycotts and exclusive dealing arrangements are subjects now under
investigation by the Monopolies and Restrictive Practices Commission.
45. See sources cited note 24 supra.
46. REPORT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, Op. cit. sispra note 22, at 15-20, 59-61.
47. Id. at 59-61.
48. In the absence of a precise definition, "public interest" is left "to mean what one
wants it to mean according to the particular school of politics, economics, sociology,
ideology, even theology to which one belongs." Sir Lynden Macassey, Q.C., quoted in
Cartel, London, July, 1952, p. 6. In the debate last year in the Economic and Social
Council it was pointed out that "cartels and combines could be the best or worst of in-
stitutions according to the use they made of their powers. . . ." M. Masoin (Belgium),
UNITED NATIONS OFFIcIAL REcORIS 243, 244 (Economic & Social Council 16th Sess,,
742d Meeting, July 30, 1953, Geneva).
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applying to this type of offense those rules which in the relations between
States are accepted as justifying an objective application of the territorial
principle. To permit each country to regulate the trade of foreign nationals
in foreign countries on the pretext that its own trade is directly affected in a
manner offensive to its own notions of public policy would make a travesty
of the principle of sovereign independence.
INAPPLICABILITY OF THE PROTECTRIVE AND UNIVERSALITY PRINCIPLES
The United States does not accept the protective principle as a jurisdictional
basis for punishing offenses committed by foreigners abroad against the
security, integrity or independence of the State.49 Even the States which do
accept this principle regard it as a limited exception to the territorial prin-
ciple. Thus in France, where a foreigner may be prosecuted, either as prin-
cipal or accomplice, for committing a crime against the safety of the State
or for counterfeiting the State seal or national currencies,O the territorial
principle, with this exception, is vigorously applied. 1 Moreover, a report of
a subcommittee of the League of Nations states that the protective principle
"relates to a very special class of crimes" and should be limited to "an agreed
and uniform list" of acts which endanger a State's security.02 No such list
has been prepared.
The assertion of the right to punish foreigners for their acts abroad has
not, however, been limited to the principle of protection. The universality
principle asserts a far wider competence: in effect it claims jurisdiction to
punish aliens as well as nationals for any crime, committed outside as well as
within the territorial limits of the prosecuting State. It is usually justified
on the grounds that "crime is an attack on a law of justice common to all
States, and consequently it concerns the public order of each of them; the
State which has the delinquent in its power may therefore judge him; it is
even its duty to do so, in virtue of 'international solidarity in the struggle
49. Harvard Research, supra note 3. at 543-63; 1 H,zi, op. cit. Mipra note 2, at
805-06: "Such legislation may be regarded as exceptional in character. Occasions for its
application were formerly infrequent and attributable to circumstances indicative of great
public need."
50. Art. 7 of the Criminal Code.
51. MOORE, REPORT ON ExRATmRnnnonum CRmE, op. cit. supra note 42, at 54-6 and
Appendix B (French court quashing the conviction of a Swiss citizen for larceny com-
mitted in Switzerland). See also, 2 LAwS AND REGuATI.ONS ON' THE: Rm= OF THE
HIGH SEAs 43 (United Nations, 1952).
52. Brierly, Criminal Competence of States in Respect of Offences Comnitted out-
side their Territory, REPORT OF COMurrrn OF ExPRErs roR TaE ProGmSsiv CooDc&-
no\ OF INTERPATioNAL LAw, PUBLICATIONS OF THE LEAGUE OF NAtmONS, (V.Le-al),
V.7. C50.M.27 pp. 3, 4 (1926). See The Case of the S.S. "Lotus," stspra note 3, at 45
(dissenting opinion of M. Weiss) ("To obtain its full force and to become a rule of
international law," the protective principle would require "the general consent of the
nations or a special convention.")
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against crime.' "3 This is the view of many States whose legal systems have
their origin in Roman Law, but it is recognized as a principle of international
law only in the case of wrongs against the law of nations, such as piracy.
The draft of The Convention on Jurisdiction with respect to Crime limited
"universality" to certain crimes committed in places not subject to the au-
thority of any State, and to crimes which were also offenses by the law of the
place where they were committed, if the offender had been offered to the
State of such place, and if the offer was unaccepted.5 4 Thus restricted, it is
inconceivable that the United States would invoke the principle of universality
as a justification for applying the antitrust laws to acts committed by foreign
nationals in foreign countries.
TREATIES AND CONVENTIONS
That extraterritorial application of the antitrust laws is not a proper sub-
ject for unilateral action on the part of the United States is recognized by
the State Department, if not by the Department of Justice. Since World
War II, strenuous efforts have been made to obtain the adherence of other
States to a convention for the international regulation of restrictive trade
practices, Late in 1945, proposals put forward by the State Department
to other nations for the "Expansion of World Trade and Employment" 0 were
incorporated into the Suggested Charter for an International Trade Organi-
zation adopted at Havana, and known as the Havana Charter. 7 But the
end product tempered the proposals' blunt prohibitions by the overall limita-
tion that prohibited acts must "have harmful effects on the expansion of pro-
duction or trade.... ." The Havana Charter, however, was never ratified by
the United States Senate. More recently, the Economic and Social Council of
the United Nations submitted to member states a modified proposal of that
part of the Havana Charter which dealt with restrictive trade practices.Ys
The significance of this proposal lies in its recognition that this is a subject
which requires treatment in the form of an international convention.
Since the War, United States' diplomatic activity in the field of trade
regulation has been intense. A clause in condemnation of combinations which
"may have harmful effects" has been incorporated into a number of bilateral
53. Quoted by Brierly, The "Lotis" Case, 44 LAw Q. REV. 154, 161 (1928).
54. Harvard Research, supra note 3, at 573-92.
55. See ABA, REPORT OF THE COMMITEE ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE REGULATION
ON IMPACT OF ANTITRUST LAWS ON FOREIGN TRADE 18-19 (Aug. 6, 1953).
56. See INTERNATIONAL CARTELs-A LEAGUE OF NATIONS MEiORANDUM 35, 36
(United Nations, Department of Economic Affairs, U.N. Pub. No. 1948. II. D.2, 1947).
57. FINAL ACT AND RELATED DOCUMENTS (United Nations Conference on Trade and
Employment, Havana, Cuba, U.N. Pub. No. 1948. II. D.4, 1948).
58. U.N. OFFICIAL RECORDS, Economic & Social Council, 16th Sess., 742d & 744th
Meetings (July 30, 31, 1953) ; Resolution Relative to Report of the Ad Hoc Committee
on Restrictive Business Practices, id. (Supp. No. 11).
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commercial treaties.m9 However, it gives no right to the United States to
prosecute the nationals of the other party to the treaty for arrangements
made by them abroad which have harmful effects upon the commerce of the
United States with that nation. The only right conferred is the right to re-
quire consultation, and it is left to the other nation to take such measures as
it deems appropriate, not as the United States may require. If the other
nation refuses to take any measure, there is still no right conferred on the
United States to proceed on its own. At the most, there is a breach of treaty
for which damages might be claimed.
STRIcT APPLICATION OF THE TERRITORIAL PRINCIPLE
Application of the antitrust laws to the citizens of other nations must,
then, be confined to acts performed by them either ithin the territorial limits
of the United States or at places which are, by international law, assimilated
to such territory. And this principle must apply to "conspiracy" cases as well
as other forms of criminal activity. The conspiracy itself, if entered into
abroad, does not in the international law sense acquire a locus within the
territory of the prosecuting state by virtue of the fact that overt acts may be
committed therein. 0° If the overt acts are themselves criminal, the state in
which they occur may punish them as such, and proof of a foreign conspiracy
may establish complicity in, and therefore liability for, such acts on the part
of foreign conspirators.0 ' But if the crime is not one which the community
of civilized nations has accepted as appropriate for the objective application of
the territorial principle or the application of the protective principle, the
foreign conspiracy itself, as in the case of any other crime completed abroad,
remains outside the competence of the State.
There would be less confusion if the rule stated by Judge Caffey at the
end of the trial in the Alcoa case were recognized:
"The vital question in all cases is the same: Is the combination to
so operate in this country as to directly and materially affect our
foreign commerce.
'652
59. See e.g., Treaty with Italy, signed Feb. 2, 1948, in force July 26, 1949, Art.
XVIII(3). For a discussion of this and other similar treaties see the ABA Ruroar, op.
ci. supra note 55, at 10, 11.
60. Cf. Reg. v. Boulton, 12 Cox 87 (1871) (English court had no jurisdiction over a
conspiracy in Scotland to commit a felony in England) ; Ford v. United States, 273 U.S.
593 (1927).
61. In France, acts of complicity abroad may be prosecuted when they constitute an
indivisible part of the principal act performed in France. an V.,n&-,s, Ls Pnn;cjzYs
'MoDE ams Du DnoiT PkxAL INTENATIO.NAL, op. cit. supra note 3, at 44-6; 2 TnAvmns,
LE DrOIT P ,ENAL INERN-ATio-mL 492-523 (1921).
62. United States v. Aluminum Company of America, 44 F. Supp. 97, 283 (S.D.N.Y.
1941) (emphasis added). For the view that mere "effect on American commerce" is
enough, see Note, Application of the Antitrust Laws to Extraterritorial Conspiracies, 49
YALE UJ. 1312, 1316-7 (1940).
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In all the cases cited by him to support this statement of the issue, the agree-
ment made abroad actually did operate within the United States in the sense
that it was partly performed there, the performance in every case being sub-
stantial. On appeal, however, Judge Hand substituted the far vaguer test of
whether the act abroad "has consequences within" the territory!3 While ad-
mitting that in the earlier cases the foreign conspirators "had sent agents
into the United States to perform part of the agreement," he dismissed this
essential distinction on the grounds that "an agent is merely an animate means
of executing his principal's purposes" and that the real test was whether the
foreign conspiracy was "intended to affect imports and did affect them."0 4
This is hardly consistent with the principles of international law which have
been discussed, or with the pre-war consent decrees in the foreign quinine,
potash, and Norwegian sardine cases. These decrees recognized the territorial
principle by providing:
". ... that nothing herein contained shall .be construed to restrain
or prohibit any defendant from doing any act or entering into any
agreement which is entirely completed outside the United States and
which does not require any act or thing to be done within the United
States."60
CONCLUSION
A due regard for the sovereignty and independence of other nations in
matters relating to their own trade thus requires restraint on the part of this
country in attempting to impose its own methods of regulating trade and
commerce outside its own territorial limits. It is a corollary of such regard
that the United States has an absolute sovereign right, whether applied to
domestic or foreign trade, to punish acts committed within its borders which
constitute a breach of such regulations. However, the United States' desire
to protect the foreign trade and commerce of American nationals, and even
its complete conviction that its own laws and methods are the way of salvation
for all the world, cannot justify an assertion of penal jurisdiction over the
commercial activities abroad of the nationals of other countries.
63. United States v. Aluminum Company of America, 148 F.2d 416, 443 (2d Cir.
1945).
64. Id. at 444.
65. United States v. Amstcrdamsche Chininefabriek, CCH, FED. TRADE REG. SERV.
4186 (S.D.N.Y. 1928) ; United States v. Deutsches Kalisyndikat Gesellsehaft, id. at 4188
(S.D.N.Y. 1929); United States v. ABC Canning Co., id. at 4213 (S.D.N.Y. 1931). See
Donovan & McAllister, Consent Decrees in the Enforcement of Federal Anti-Trust Laws,
46 HARV. L. REv. 885, 924-5 (1933). For the more limited recognition of the territorial
principle in the ICI decree, see note 14 supra.
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